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FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLICATION TO THE
MASS WELFARE SEARCH
Early Sunday morning, January 13, 1963, seventy-five social welfare workers
from the Alameda County Welfare Department made an unannounced "raid" on
the homes of 417 Aid to Needy Children (ANC) recipients.1 The principal pur-
pose of this "raid," described as "Operation Weekend," was the detection of
welfare fraud, which, in this case, consisted of unreported or unauthorized men
living in the homes of mothers receiving ANC grants. 2
"Operation Weekend" was carried out in dragnet fashion. The welfare worker
known to the recipient went to the front door, and a second worker went to the
rear entrance to prevent the escape of any unauthorized males. After knocking,
the welfare worker identified himself, explained his purpose, and asked for ad-
mittance.3 Once admitted, he went to the rear of the dwelling and admitted his
partner, whereupon they conducted a thorough search of the house. This type of
search generally included "looking in and under the beds,"4 as well as "looking in
closets, drawers, attics, medicine chests, children's bedrooms," 5 searching not only
for a man but for evidence of his living there.
Depending on the evidence found, several courses of action were available.
If the evidence disclosed a clear case of welfare fraud, which in California may
be punishable as grand theft,6 the case would be referred to the district attorney
for possible prosecution. If the evidence was less incriminating, and a clear case
of welfare fraud was not disclosed, the evidence could still be used as grounds for
discontinuing or reducing the aid grant.7
One Alameda County welfare worker, Benny Max Parrish, refused to partici-
pate in "Operation Weekend" for the reason that he believed the searches violated
the constitutional rights of the welfare recipients.s As a result of his refusal he was
I Out of the 417 cases investigated, 265 were found in order and 152 required addi-
tional investigation. Of these requiring further investigation, 92 had been chosen from
"suspect" cases and 60 from cases chosen at random. In a total of 20 cases aid was dis-
continued. Alameda County Welfare Dep't, Statistical Summary Operation Weekend,
Jan. 13, 1963.2 Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 242 A.C.A. 665, 667, 51 Cal. Rptr. 589, 591 (1966),
appeal argued, SF 22429, Cal. Sup. Ct., Dec. 5, 1966. The types of welfare fraud fall
into three catagories: (1) the presence of an unreported man in the home, including an
absent father, (2) the failure to report income, and (3) receiving aid for children who
were not in the home or who were otherwise ineligible for public assistance. Reichert,
Relationships Between Welfare and Law Enforcement Agencies in California, in CAL.
WELPAnE STunY COM 'N CoNsuLTANTS' REPORTs, pt. If, App. F at 281 (1963).
8 Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, supra note 2, at 668, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
4 Id. at 669, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
5 Reichert, supra note 2, at 300.
6 People v. Shirley, 55 Cal. 2d 521, 11 Cal. Rptr. 537, 360 P.2d 33 (1961); People
v. Phipps, 191 Cal. App. 2d 448, 12 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1961).
7Alameda County Welfare Dep't, supra note 1. For a complete compilation of sta-
tistics for each county concerning convictions for welfare fraud and discontinuances of
aid in California see Cal. Dep't Social Welfare, Recipient Fraud Report, Research and
Statistics, July 1964.
8 Mr. Parrish contended that the mass visitations were degrading, were based on the
presumption of the guilt of the recipients, were violative of their right to privacy, were
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discharged. On appeal of his suit for reinstatement, a California District Court of
Appeal held that he had not been asked to violate the constitutional rights of
welfare recipients, 9 and thus affirmed his discharge.
The critical question to be considered is whether this type of mass welfare
search is legal in light of the fourth amendmenfs prohibitions of unreasonable
searches and seizures.' 0
Protections of the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The basic purpose of this amendment is to secure the individual's right to privacy
from unreasonable or arbitrary governmental intrusion into his home and personal
effects."l Both the United States Supreme Court and the California supreme court
have stressed the importance of this right by granting it protection.' 2 Further-
more, the fundamental rights of the fourth amendment apply to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' s
The protections of the fourth amendment, including its safeguard of individual
privacy in the home, are secured by the express requirement that a valid search
warrant based on "probable cause" 14 be issued. Traditionally, this warrant must
not required under his job classification, and were inconsistent with his training and the
rehabilitative goals of the ANC program. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 242 A.C.A. 665,
667, 51 Cal. Rptr. 589, 591 (1966), appeal argued, SF 22429, Cal. Sup. Ct., Dec. 5,
1966. The Parrish case involves two important questions. First, there is the broad ques-
tion of whether mass welfare searches, as conducted in "Operation Weekend," are reason-
able within the fourth amendment. Scond, there is the question of whether Parrish could
base his suit for reinstatement upon violation of the constitutional rights of others. Then,
should this question be answered affirmatively, it must be determined whether it would
be premature for Parrish to contend, prior to the searches, that they could not possibly
be undertaken without violation of the fourth amendment rights of the welfare recipients.
This note is limited to a discussion of the validity of the mass welfare search under the
fourth amendment. No attempt will be made to resolve the merits of Parrish's suit for
reinstatement.
9 Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, supra note 8, at 674, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
10 See generally Reichert, supra note 2; Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the
Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963); tenBroek, California's Dual System of
Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 17 STAN. L. REv. 614, 662-71
(1965).
11 E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 511 (1961). In exploring the guarantee of the fourth amendment, the Supreme
Court said it applies "to all invasions on the part of the government and its employ6s of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886).
12 E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948); People v. Caban, 44 Cal.
2d 434, 438, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955).
13 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14 There were no grounds indicating probable cause in "Operation Weekend."
Fifty-five per cent of the cases chosen were picked from the welfare case file at random,
November, 1966) NOTES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
be drawn "by a neutral and detached magistrate."' 5 Searches of private dwellings
without a warrant 16 and general searches with or without a warrant are unreason-
able.' 7 The courts have consistently held such searches to be violative of the
fourth amendments fundamental protection1s Therefore, as a general rule, in
order for a search to be reasonable, i.e. constitutional, the requirement of a
search warrant must be satisfied.
Exceptions to the General Rule
There are several exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant. First,
under the Frank doctrine it has been held that a warrant is not necessary where
an administrative agency conducts a search of a private dwelling pursuant to a
city ordinance.' 9 Second, there are a number of well-defined exceptions that have
developed in the area of criminal law. These include a search incident to a lawful
arrest,20 a search necessitated by an emergency,2i. and a search pursuant to the
home owner's consent.22 Since no warrant was issued, or even requested, in
"Operation Weekend" it is necessary to consider the mass welfare search in the
light of these exceptions.
Searches Under the Frank Doctrine
Generally, a search conducted by an administrative agency that qualifies under
the Frank doctrine is based upon a city health or building ordinance which re-
and the other forty-five per cent listed as "suspect" cases were chosen on the basis that
their eligibility had not been redetermined in the last six months or on -the recommenda-
tion of the case worker. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 242 A.C.A. 665, 667-68, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 589, 591 (1966).
15 The reason that a magistrate must make the decision as to whether the privacy
of a citizen's home will be invaded is that an officer might not objectively determine the
matter because he is "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
16 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
17 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965).
IS.E.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 456 (1932); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927); United
States v. Kidd, 153 F. Supp. 605, 609 (W.D. La. 1957); United States v. Rembert, 284
Fed. 996, 1006 (S.D. Tex. 1922).
In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931), the Court
said of the fourth amendment, "it emphasizes the purpose to protect against all general
searches. Since before the creation of our government, such searches have been deemed
obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty. They are denounced in the constitutions
or statutes of every State in the Union."
19 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (building ordinance); Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (health ordinance); District of Columbia v. Little,
178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950) (health
ordinance); Camara v. Municipal Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 128, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1965),
prob. juris., noted, 87 Sup. Ct. 31 (1966) (housing code); People v. Laveme, 14 N.Y.2d
304, 200 N.E.2d 441 (1964) (building ordinance); City of Seattle v. See, 67 Wash. 465,
408 P.2d 262 (1965) (fire ordinance).
2o Pennsylvania v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22, 32 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1019 (1966); District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949),
aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
21 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
22 Nelson v. Hancock, 239 F. Supp. 857, 869 (D.N.H. 1965).
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quires one to submit to inspection of his dwelling without the prior issuance of a
search warrant.23 Refusal to submit may result in a fine and/or imprisonment. The
main constitutional issue involved in these cases has been whether the fourth
amendment applies and a search warrant is, therefore, required.
The question was first presented in District of Columbia v. Little,24 where an
ordinance provided that a health inspector may enter dwellings without a search
warrant. Little refused entry and was convicted under the ordinance. The District
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declared the search unreasonable,
holding that the fourth amendment prohibited warrantless searches regardless of
the officer or his mission.25 Judge Prettyman argued that, "to say that a man
suspected of a crime has a right to protection against search of his home without
a warrant, but that a man not suspected of crime has no such protection, is a
fantastic absurdity."26
This reasoning, however, was not adopted by the majority of the United States
Supreme Court when it faced the same issue ten years later in Frank v. Mary-
land.27 Instead,. the Court held that a city health ordinance which provided that
a health inspector may search a dwelling without a warrant was constitutional.
The decision was based on the preservation of minimum health standards and
the general welfare of the community. But the Court noted that the ordinance
allowed this type of search only where it was suspected that minimum standards
were not being met.
28
The following year, the Court in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price29 upheld a pro-
vision of a city building code allowing entry without a warrant. The code was
upheld on essentially the same grounds as the majority opinion in Frank. The
four dissenters argued that the fourth amendment secured the individual house-
holder's right to refuse to open his door to an official who had not previously
obtained a search warrant,3 0 and thus protected the citizen's right to be free from
all arbitrary governmental invasion into his dwelling. There have been only a few
state cases involving this issue, and most have followed the Frank and Price
decisions.s1 However, many writers have criticized this view.32
23 Casts cited note 19 supra.
24 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
25 Id. at 17.
26 Ibid.
27 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
28 Id. at 368. The decision was five to four with a vigorous dissenting opinion by
Justice Douglas, in which he argued that the fourth amendment was "designed to
protect the citizen against uncontrolled invasion of his privacy," and the "mere say
so of an oflcial" is not enough to avoid the requirement of a search warrant. Id. at
381, 384.
29 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (affirmed by tie vote).
30 Id. at 273.
31.E.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 128, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1965); accord, City of Seattle v. See, 67 Wash. 465, 408 P.2d 262 (1965) (inspection
of a business establishment, not a dwelling). But see People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y. 2d 304,
200 N.E.2d 441 (1964). In this case the court held that where a criminal prosecution
was based on a warrantless administrative search the evidence obtained was inadmis-
sible and the search was unlawful.
32 See generally Waters, Rights of Entry in Administrative Officers, 27 U. Cm.
L. REv. 525 (1959-60); Comment, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amend-
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A comparison of "Operation Weekend" with the cases under the Frank doc-
trine reveals many distinguishing features. "Operation Weekend" was undertaken
pursuant to a broad provision of the California Welfare and Institutions Code33
which vests in the county complete discretion for the redetermination of the
welfare recipients eligibility. The searches under the Frank doctrine were all
undertaken pursuant to city health, fire, or building ordinances which specifically
permitted entry without a warrant.3 4 The main purpose of "Operation Weekend"
was the detection of welfare fraud; 35 while the main purpose of the searches
under the Frank doctrine, in general, was to safeguard the health, safety, and
general welfare of the community. Unlike the searches under the Frank doctrine,
the mass welfare search was not an isolated invasion of one home.36 Moreover, it
was conducted at an unreasonable time,37 whereas each search under the Frank
doctrine was conducted on a weekday at a reasonable hour. Even the majority
in Frank justified its decision by observing that there "was no midnight knock on
the door, but an orderly visit in the middle of the afternoon with no suggestion
that the hour was inconvenient."38
It seems doubtful that the mass welfare search could qualify as a search
within the Frank doctrine. 39 As it is difficult to characterize this search as a
routine visit to redetermine welfare eligibility, i.e. as an exception to the fourth
amendment requirement of a search warrant under the Frank doctrine, the mass
welfare search must be analyzed in terms of the other exceptions that have de-
veloped in the field of criminal law.
ment--A Rationale, 65 COLum. L. REv. 288 (1965); Comment, State Health Inspections
and Unreasonable Search: The "Frank" Exclusion of Civil Searches, 44 Mnua. L. R-v.
513 (1959-60); Comment, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 30
Mo. L. Rv. 612 (1965); 50 CoRNELL L.Q. 282 (1965); 33 FonnHAm L. 11REV. 297
(1964); 10 HAsTrNGs L.J. 430 (1959); 7 How. L.J. 80 (1961); 34 TurL. L. REv. 202
(1959-60); 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 79 (1959-60); 41 WAsH. L. REv. 525 (1966).
33 Cal. Stat. 1953, ch. 275, at 1427. This statute at the time of Parrish provided:
"The county is responsible for the eligibility of all recipients of aid under this chapter
and shall as often as necessary redetermine eligibility of all recipients to receive aid."
For the present codification of this section see CAL. WEL-FARE & INSTNS CODE §§ 11454,
11476.
3 4 An example of an ordinance which permits entry without a warrant, which was
the basis for the administrative search in the Camara case, is SAN FRANCISco, CAL.,
Mumcn'AL CODE § 503: "Authorized employees of the City departments or City
agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon
presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any
building, structure or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them
by the Municipal Code."
35Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 242 A.C.A. 665, 669, 51 Cal. Rptr. 589, 592
(1966).
86 Alameda County Welfare Dep't, supra note 1.
3 7 In "Operation Weekend" the search was conducted between 6:30 a.m. and
10:30 a.m. on a Sunday. 242 A.C.A. at 667, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
38 359 U.S. at 366.
39 See Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE
L.J. 1347, 1350-53 (1963).
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Exceptions in the Field of Criminal Law
There are three generally recognized exceptions to the requirement of a search
warrant which have developed in regard to searches in the field of criminal law.
One such exception concerns a search incident to a lawful arrest.40 A second ex-
ception dispenses with the requirement of a search warrant where an emergency
situation arises, i.e. where the search and seizure are necessary to prevent the
escape of a criminal or the destruction of evidence.41
The third exception, and one through which the mass welfare search most
convincingly seeks justification, is the consent to a warrantless search. 42 Consent
amounts to a voluntary waiver of the constitutional right to demand that a search
warrant be issued before entrance to the home is permitted. There has been gen-
eral agreement that consent is a question of fact to be determined in light of all
the surrounding circumstances.43 Recently, the United States Supreme Court has
established that waiver of constitutional rights cannot be assumed,44 and waiver
in this context means the knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a right 'or
privilege. 4
5
In order to find a valid waiver, consent to a warrantless search must be
voluntarily,46 unequivocally and intelligently47 given. Consent is not valid if given
through physical or moral submission to an express or implied assertion of au-
thority.48 Furthermore, the burden of proving a valid consent is on the party
claiming that consent was given,49 and the party who was searched need not
prove lack of consent.
4 0 Pennsylvania v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22, 32 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1019 (1966); District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd
on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950). For a discussion of searches incident to arrest see
Note, 17 BAY OR L. REv. 312 (1965).
41Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).42 Nelson v. Hancock, 239 F. Supp. 857, 869 (D.N.H. 1965).
43 See, e.g., People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45, 301 P.2d 241 (1956); People
v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 290 P.2d 852 (1955); People v. Murillo, 241 A.C.A. 227,
50 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1966); People v. McGhee, 196 Cal. App. 2d 458, 16 Cal. Rptr. 625
(1961); People v. Sanchez, 191 Cal. App. 2d 783, 12 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1961); People
v. Hood, 149 Cal. App. 2d 836, 309 P.2d 135 (1957); People v. Smith, 141 Cal. App.
2d 399, 296 P.2d 913 (1956).
44 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966).
45 Id. at 492.
46 Canida v. United States, 250 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1958); Talavera v. State,
186 So. 2d 811, 814 (Fla. 1966).
47 Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
4 S Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255
U.S. 313, 317 (1921); Canida v. United States, 250 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1958);
Honig v. United States, 208 F.2d 916, 919 (8th Cir. 1953); United States v. Reckis,
119 F. Supp. 687, 690 (D. Mass. 1954); United States v. Rembert, 284 Fed. 996, 998
(SD. Tex. 1922).
49 Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Nelson v. Hancock,
239 F. Supp. 857, 869 (D.N.H. 1965); United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687, 691
(D. Mass. 1954); Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269, 272, 294 P.2d 23, 25
(1956); People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 782, 291 P.2d 469, 472 (1955).
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There have been many cases where an officer knocked at the door of a dwell-
ing, without a warrant, and asked permission to search. The owner has then
admitted him by stepping back,50 saying, "go ahead and search" 51 or "go ahead
and look around," 2 or "help yourselves."53 Many courts have held that this type
of reaction is not a valid indication of voluntary waiver, but rather is a peaceful
submission to authority.54
The result is clear when the facts of "Operation Weekend" are applied to
these exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant. First, it should be noted
that as no warrant was issued to search any welfare recipient's home, the search
was prima facie unreasonable.55 Second, the mass welfare search was not con-
ducted as incident to a lawful arrest. Finally, this search was not in response to
an emergency; on the contrary, it was several weeks in the planning56 and was
not contingent on an immediate crisis where time and opportunity prevented
application to a magistrate. 57 Therefore, the warrantless search in "Operation
Weekend" must seek justification within the doctrine of consent.
The United States Supreme Court has strongly maintained that consent, as a
question of fact, may not be assumed. 58 There must also be convincing evidence
to support a finding of consent,5 9 and thus waiver of the right to refuse to submit
to a search without prior issuance of a search warrant.
On examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding "Operation Week-
end" and other mass welfare searches, it is difficult to accept the idea that one
hundred per cent of the ANC recipients unequivocally, intelligently, and volun-
tarily waived their constitutional rights. Out of 86,000 ANC mothers in California
one-third have eighth grade educations or less, one-third have only partially
5o People v. White, 231 Cal. App. 2d 82, 87, 41 Cal. Rptr. 604, 607 (1964).
51 Pritchett v. State, 78 Okla. Crim. 67, 143 P.2d 622, 623 (1943).
52Dukes v. United States, 275 Fed. 142, 144 (4th Cir. 1921).
53 People v. Reid, 315 Ill. 597, 598, 146 N.E. 504, 505 (1925).
54 E.g., Dukes v. United States, 275 Fed. 142 (4th Cir. 1921); Nelson v. Hancock,
239 F. Supp. 857, 869 (D.N.H. 1965); United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687, 691
(D. Mass. 1954); United States v. Hoffenberg, 24 F. Supp. 989, 991 (E.D.N.Y. 1938);
People v. White, 231 Cal. App. 2d 82, 41 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1964); Talavera v. State,
186 So. 2d 811, 814 (Fla. 1966); Pritchett v. State, 78 Okla. Crim. 67, 143 P.2d 622
(1943); People v. Reid, 315 Ill. 597, 600, 146 N.E. 504, 505 (1925); Meno v. State,
197 Ind. 16, 24, 164 N.E. 93, 96 (1925). Contra, People v. McLean, 56 Cal. 2d 660,
16 Cal. Rptr. 347, 365 P.2d 403 (1961); People v. Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45, 301 P.2d 241
(1956); People v. McGhee, 196 Cal. App. 2d 458, 16 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1961).
55People v. Haven, 59 Cal. 2d 713, 31 Cal. Rptr. 47, 381 P.2d 927 (1963); see
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
56 On November 20, 1962 a resolution was adopted to conduct "Operation Week-
end" and it was carried out January 13, 1963. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 242 A.C.A.
665, 667, 51 Cal. Rptr. 589, 591 (1966), appeal argued, SF 22429, Cal. Sup. Ct., Dec.
5, 1966.
57 District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), agfd on
other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
58 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506, 516 (1962).
59 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Nueslein v. District of
Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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completed high school, and only twenty-one per cent have been graduated from
high school.60 Their average age is thirty-three, and they are employed in the
least remunerative occupations, if they are employed at al.61 They have virtually
no personal property and only slightly over one per cent own any real property.
62
Most are burdened with abnormal family situations, live in extreme poverty and
are dependent completely on public assistance. 63 Professor tenBroek has poig-
nantly described how unlikely it is for the ANC recipient effectively to give her
consent under the circumstances of the mass welfare search:
Investigators ringing the doorbell in the middle of the night and identifying
themselves as officials ...especially, if they are caseworkers known to the
recipient from past contacts in connection with welfare . . . represent authority
to the recipient, authority whose mere presence constitutes coercion to some
degree and whose request to enter, however politely phrased, is in the nature of
an order. Even more important, the readily available means by which authority
may be exerted is sharp in her mind. She is almost certain to feel that refusal to
consent will bear adversely on her aid grant and thus deprive her and her children
of their only source of support. . . She knows that among other things she
must submit to home visits by her worker.6 4
The question arose in planning "Operation Weekend" whether refusal of entry
would automatically be grounds for the discontinuance of aid, as it had been in
past investigations.65 The welfare workers were instructed "that if admission was
not granted, benefits would not automatically be discontinued but the reason for
denying admission would subsequently be investigated."66 However, as it was
unlikely that the recipient was aware of these instructions, one might reasonably
conclude that she merely submitted to the authority represented by the case
worker.
It is doubtful, therefore, that under these facts and circumstances consent
was obtained. Consequently, the welfare search cannot be justified as within
any of these three recognized exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant.
60 Cal. Dep't Social Welfare, Characteristics of Recipients of Aid to Needy Children,
Research Series Report No. 20, July 1963.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 tenBroek, Californids Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and
Present Status, 17 STAr. L. REv. 614, 670 (1965).
04 Id. at 669-70. On the issue of the welfare recipient's consent to extraordinary
searches of his dwelling, basic questions arise on the theory of social welfare. By his
acceptance of public assistance does the welfare recipient impliedly consent to the
imposition of extraordinary investigations to redetermine his welfare eligibility? Does
he waive thereby some degree of the fourth amendment's protections? Or might one
say that within the context of our affluent society there is a duty on the part of the
state to provide public assistance to those who are unable to provide for themselves?
Therefore, the state may impose no conditions, and no waiver of fourth amendment
protections may be implied, upon the acceptance of public assistance by those otherwise
determined to be eligible. See Reich, supra note 39 at 1349-50, 1359-60.
6r 242 A.C.A. at 668, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
66 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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Conclusion
The mass welfare search does not qualify as an exception to the requirement
of a search warrant under the Frank doctrine.67 Therefore, a search warrant is a
necessary prerequisite to this type of search unless one of the exceptions which
have developed in the field of criminal law is applicable. The warrantless searches
conducted in "Operation Weekend" did not come within any of these recognized
exceptions to the formal requirement of a search warrant. Thus, these searches
were violative of the fourth amendment rights of ANC recipients.
In addition, the mass welfare search has not been officially endorsed by the
federal and state welfare agencies. 68 It has been condemned by these agencies in
recommended guidelines which attempt to assure that the fourth amendment
rights of welfare recipients be respected by the county welfare agencies.69 Never-
theless, these searches have continued.7 An effective remedy might be supplied
by judicial determination that the mass welfare search is unreasonable and in
violation of the fourth amendment rights of those receiving public assistance.
Peter 1. Laird*
6 7 It seems doubtful that the Frank doctrine will be extended. Decisions since the
Frank case seem to indicate that the Court is moving towards a broader, rather than
a more limited, interpretation of the fourth amendments protection of the individual's
right to privacy. Reich, supra note 39, at 1351. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961).
68 U.S. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AssISTANCE, uBLIc ASSISTANCE ADm-VINISTATION, pt. IV,
§ 2600 (1965); Cal. Dep't Social Welfare, Dep't Bulletin No. 624, August 5, 1963.
69 The Cal. Dep't of Social Welfare made the following criticism of mass welfare
searches: "Mass, indiscriminate or dragnet home visits are not to be used either for the
purpose of fraud detection or for the purpose of deterring fraud. They are not to be
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70 The Cal. Dep't of Social Welfare in a recent review of the Alameda County
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